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Large, complex networks are ubiquitous in nature and society, and there is great interest in developing rigorous,
scalable methods for identifying and characterizing their vulnerabilities. This paper presents an approach for
analyzing the dynamics of complex networks in which the network of interest is first abstracted to a much simpler,
but mathematically equivalent, representation, the required analysis is performed on the abstraction, and analytic
conclusions are then mapped back to the original network and interpreted there. We begin by identifying a broad
and important class of complex networks which admit vulnerability-preserving, finite state abstractions, and develop
efficient algorithms for computing these abstractions. We then propose a vulnerability analysis methodology which
combines these finite state abstractions with formal analytics from theoretical computer science to yield a
comprehensive vulnerability analysis process for networks of real-world scale and complexity. The potential of the
proposed approach is illustrated via case studies involving a realistic electric power grid, a gene regulatory network,
and a general class of social network dynamics.
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It is widely recognized that technological, biological, and
social networks, while impressively robust in most cir-
cumstances, can fail catastrophically in response to fo-
cused attacks. Indeed, this combination of robustness
and fragility appears to be an inherent property of com-
plex, evolving networks ranging from the Internet and
electric power grids to gene regulatory networks and fi-
nancial markets e.g., [1-5]. As a consequence, there is
significant interest in developing methods for reliably
detecting and characterizing the vulnerabilities of these
networks e.g., [6,7].
The challenges of vulnerability analysis are particu-
larly daunting in the case of complex networks. Most
such networks are large-scale “systems of systems”, so
that analysis methods must be computationally effi-
cient. Additionally, because these networks perform re-
liably almost all of the time, standard techniques for
finding vulnerabilities (e.g., computer simulations, “red* Correspondence: colbaugh@comcast.net
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origteaming”) can be ineffective and, in any case, are not
guaranteed to identify all vulnerabilities. These observa-
tions suggest that, in order to be practically useful, any
method for analyzing vulnerabilities of complex net-
works should be scalable, to enable analysis of net-
works of real-world complexity, and rigorous, so that
for instance it is guaranteed to find all vulnerabilities
of a given class.
This paper presents a new approach to vulnerability
analysis which possesses these properties. The proposed
methodology is based upon aggressive abstraction – dra-
matically simplifying, property preserving abstraction of
the network of interest [4]. Once an aggressive abstrac-
tion is derived, all required analysis is performed using
the abstraction. Analytic conclusions are then mapped
back to the original network and interpreted there; this
mapping is possible because of the property preserving
nature of the abstraction procedure.
Our focus is on dynamical systems with uncountable
state spaces, as many complex networks are of this type.
We begin by identifying a large and important class of
dynamical networks which admit vulnerability-preserving,
finite state abstractions, and develop efficient algorithmsThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
abstraction
Figure 1 Finite state abstraction. Cartoon illustrates that the
abstraction preserves network dynamics: trajectories of the infinite
state system (curves in blue region at bottom) are mapped to
equivalent finite state trajectories (sequences of state transitions at
top).
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straction. We then offer a methodology which combines
these finite state models with formal analytics from theor-
etical computer science [8] to provide a comprehensive
vulnerability analysis process for large-scale networks. The
potential utility of the proposed approach to vulnerability
analysis is illustrated through case studies involving a real-
istic electric power grid, a gene regulatory network, and a
general class of social network dynamics.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the class of network models to
be considered in the paper and briefly summarizes some
technical background that will be useful in our
development.
The evolution to ensure robust performance in com-
plex networks typically leads to systems that possess a
“hybrid” structure, exhibiting both continuous and
discrete dynamics [4]. More precisely, these networks
often evolve to become hybrid dynamical systems –
feedback interconnections of switching systems, which
have discrete state sets, with systems whose dynamics
evolve on continuous state spaces [9].
More quantitatively, consider the following definitions
for hybrid dynamical system (HDS) models:




qþ ¼ h q; kð Þ;
dx=dt ¼ fq x; uð Þ;
k ¼ p xð Þ;
where q2Q (with |Q| finite) and x2Xℜn (with X
bounded) are the states of the discrete and continuous
systems that make up the HDS, u2ℜm is the control in-
put, h defines the discrete system dynamics, {fq} is a
family of vector fields characterizing the continuous sys-
tem dynamics, and p defines a partition of state space X
into subsets with labels k2{1, . . ., K}.
Definition 2.2: A discrete-time HDS is a control system
X
HDSdt
qþ ¼ h q; kð Þ;
xþ ¼ fq x; uð Þ;
k ¼ p xð Þ:
We sometimes refer to an HDS using the symbol ΣHDS if
the nature of the continuous system (continuous- or
discrete-time) is either unimportant or clear from the
context.
The concept of finite state abstraction for an infinite
state system is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider a com-
plex network with states that evolve on a continuous
space and an analysis question of interest. Such a situ-
ation is depicted at the bottom of Figure 1, where thecontinuous dynamics are shown as curves on a con-
tinuous state space (blue region), and the analysis
question involves deciding whether states in the green
region can evolve to the red region. Reachability ques-
tions of this sort are difficult to answer for generic
complex networks. However, if it is possible to con-
struct a finite state abstraction of the network which
possesses equivalent dynamics, then the analysis task
becomes much easier. To see this, observe from Figure 1
that a finite state abstraction of the original dynamics
takes the form of a graph, where the states are graph verti-
ces (nodes within the blue region at top) and feasible
state transitions define the graph’s directed edges.
Reachability analysis is straightforward with a graph,
and if the complex network and its abstraction have
equivalent reachability properties then the much sim-
pler graph analysis also characterizes the reachability
of the original system.
Reachability assessment, while valuable, is typically
not sufficient to answer real-world vulnerability analysis
questions. For instance, suppose that the red region in
Figure 1 is the set of failure states. It may be of interest
to determine if all system trajectories which reach the
red region first pass through the white “alerting” region,
so there is warning of impending failure, or whether all
trajectories which reach the red region subsequently re-
turn to the blue “normal” region, and thereby recover
from failure. Addressing these more intricate questions
requires that the analysis be conducted using a lan-
guage which allows a nuanced description of, and rea-
soning about, network dynamics. We show in [4] that
linear temporal logic (LTL) provides such a language,
enabling quantitative specification of a broad range of
complex network vulnerability problems. LTL extends
Colbaugh and Glass Security Informatics 2012, 1:9 Page 3 of 11
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/9propositional logic by including temporal operators,
thereby allowing dynamical phenomena to be analyzed,
and is similar to natural language and thus is easy to
use [10].
As we wish to use LTL to analyze the dynamics of
complex networks and we model these networks as
HDS, we tailor our definition of LTL to be compatible
with this setting:
Definition 2.3: The syntax of LTL consists of
 atomic propositions (q,k), where q 2 Q is an HDS
discrete state and k 2 K is a label for a subset in the
continuous system state space partition;
 formulas composed from atomic propositions using
a grammar of Boolean (φ ∨ θ, ¬φ) and temporal
(φUθ, ○ φ) operators.
The semantics of LTL follows from interpreting formulas
on trajectories of HDS, that is, on sequences of (q, k)
pairs: (q, k) = (q0, k0), (q1, k1), . . ., (qT, kT).
The Boolean operators ∨ and ¬ are disjunction and
negation, as usual. The temporal operators U and ○ are
read “until” and “next”, respectively, with φUθ specifying
that φ must hold until θ holds and ○ φ signifying that φ
will be true at the next time instant (see [10] for a more
thorough description).
Abstractions which preserve LTL also preserve all
vulnerabilities expressible as LTL formulas; this property
is stated more precisely in Section 4, where a formal
definition is given for system vulnerability, and is also
explained in [4]. Thus we seek an abstraction proced-
ure which preserves LTL: given a system representa-
tion Σ1, the procedure should generate a system
abstraction Σ2 which is such that {Σ1 |= φ}, {Σ2 |= φ}
for all LTL formulas φ (where | = denotes formula satisfac-
tion). Bisimulation is a powerful method for abstracting
finite state systems to yield simpler finite state sys-
tems that are equivalent from the perspective of LTL
[10]. However, the problem of constructing finite state
bisimulations for continuous state systems is largely
unexplored (but see the seminal work [11,12]). In-
deed, one of the contributions of this paper is to de-
velop a theoretically sound, practically implementable
approach to obtaining finite state bisimulations for
complex network models.
Bisimulation is typically defined for transition systems,
so we first introduce this notion (see [10] for details):
Definition 2.4: A transition system is a four-tuple T =
(S,!, Y, h) with state set S, transition relation!  S × S,
output set Y, and output map h: S! Y. T is finite if |S| is
finite.
Transition relation ! defines admissible state transi-
tions, so (q, q0)2!, denoted q ! q0, if T can transition
from q to q0.Bisimilar transition systems share a common output
set and have dynamics which are equivalent from the
perspective of these outputs:
Definition 2.5: Transition systems TS = (S, !S, Y, hS)
and TP = (P, !P, Y, hP) are bisimilar via relation R  S ×
P if:
 s ~ p ⇒ hS(s) = hP(p) (R respects observations);
 s ~ p, s !S s0 ⇒ ∃ p0 ~ s0 such that p !P p0
(TP simulates TS, denoted TS ∠ TP);
 p ~ s, p !P p0 ⇒ ∃ s0 ~ p0 such that s !S s0
(TP ∠ TS),
where ~ denotes equivalence under relation R.
A standard result from theoretical computer science e.
g., [10] shows that bisimulation preserves LTL:
Proposition 2.1: If T1 and T2 are bisimilar transition
systems and φ is an LTL formula then {T1 |= φ} , { T2
|= φ}.
The following statements offer an alternative definition
for bisimulation, which is easily shown to be equivalent
to the one presented in Definition 2.5 and is useful in
the subsequent development:
Definition 2.6: A finite partition Φ: S ! P of the state
space S of transition system T = (S, !, Y, h) naturally
induces a quotient transition system T/~ = (P, !~, Y, h~)
of T provided that
 Φ(s) = Φ(s0) (denoted s ~ s0) ⇒ h(s) = h(s0);
 h~(p) = h(s) if p = Φ(s);
 !~ is defined so that Φ(s) !~ Φ(s0) iff s ! s0.
Transition system T and its quotient T/~ are bisimilar if
an additional condition holds:
Proposition 2.2: Suppose T/~ is defined as in Defin-
ition 2.6 and, in addition, Φ(s) !~ Φ(s0) ⇒ 8 s00 ~ s ∃
s000 ~ s0 such that s00 ! s000. Then T and T/~ are
bisimilar.
Finally, we introduce a class of continuous state (con-
trol) systems which is important in applications.
Definition 2.7: The continuous-time system dx/dt = f
(x,u), with f: ℜn×ℜm!ℜn, is differentially flat if there
exists (flat) outputs z2ℜm such that z = H(x), x = F1(z,
dz/dt, . . ., drz/dtr), and u = F2(z, dz/dt, . . ., d
rz/dtr) for
some integer r and maps H, F1, F2.
Definition 2.8: The discrete-time system x + = f(x,u)
is difference flat (with memory k) if there exists (flat)
outputs z2ℜm such that z = H(x), x(t) = F1(z(t), z(t + 1),
. . ., z(t + k − 1)), and u(t) = F2(z(t), z(t + 1), . . ., z(t + k
− 1)) for some maps H, F1, F2.
Background on flat systems may be found in [13].
Many real-world control systems are flat, including all con-
trollable linear systems as well as all feedback linearizable
systems. Perhaps more importantly, the complex,
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technology, biology, and social processes frequently
possess flat subsystems.Finite state abstraction
In this section we demonstrate that hybrid systems with
(differentially or difference) flat continuous systems
admit finite state bisimulations and present algorithms
for constructing the bisimilar abstractions.
Consider an HDS of the form given in Definition 2.1
or 2.2. The following provides a transition system repre-
sentation for the continuous system dynamics of HDS:
Definition 3.1: The transition system model THDSc for
the continuous system portion of ΣHDS is the collection
THDSc = {Tq





k) specified for each (q, k) pair. Each Tq
k has
bounded state space Xq




k ! Yqk that defines a finite partition of Xqk
with labels y2Yqk, and transition relation !qk reflecting
the discrete- or continuous-time dynamics:
 for discrete-time continuous systems, x !qk x0 iff ∃u
such that x0 = fq(x,u) on subset k;
 for continuous-time continuous systems, x !qk x0 iff
there is a trajectory x: [0, T]! Xqk of dx/dt = fq(x,u),
a time t02 (0,T), and adjacent partitions of Xqk labeled
y, y02Yqk such that x(0) = x, x(T) = x0, x([0,t0))y, and
x((t0,T])y0.
We make the standard assumption that k: X ! K parti-
tions the HDS continuous system state space X into
polytopes and that all HDS discrete system transitions
are triggered by k transitions [9] (see Definitions 2.1 and
2.2).
Definition 3.1 allows ΣHDS to be modeled as a feed-
back interconnection of two transition systems, one with
continuous state space and one with finite state set:
Definition 3.2: The transition system THDS associated
with the HDS given in Definition 2.1 or 2.2 is a feedback
interconnection of 1.) the continuous system transition
system THDSc = {Tq
k} given in Definition 3.1 and 2.) the
transition system associated with the HDS discrete sys-
tem, given by THDSd = (Q, !d, Q, id), where id is the
identity map and q !d q0 iff ∃k such that q0 = h(q, k).
Thus THDS = (Q × X,!HDS, Q × Y, hHDS), where Q × X =
[q ([k {q} × Xqk), Q × Y = [q ([k {q} × Yqk), and the defini-
tions for!HDS and hHDS follow immediately from the tran-
sition relation and output map definitions specified for
THDSc and THDSd.
Because the transition system THDSd corresponding to
the HDS discrete system is already a finite state system,
the main challenge in abstracting HDS to finite state sys-
tems is associated with finding finite state bisimulationsfor the continuous systems THDSc = {Tq
k}. This is made
explicit in the following
Theorem 1: If each transition system Tq
k associated
with THDS is bisimilar to some finite quotient transition
system Tq
k/~ = (Yq
k, !~, Yqk, id) and the state space quo-
tient partitions defined by the hq
k satisfy a mild compati-
bility condition then THDS admits a finite bisimulation.
Proof: The proof is straightforward and is given in [4].
Theorem 1 shows that the key step in obtaining a fi-
nite state bisimulation for HDS THDS, and thus for ΣHDS,
is constructing bisimulations for the continuous state
transition systems Tq
k. We therefore focus on this latter
problem for the remainder of the section. Our first main
result along these lines is for difference flat continuous
systems:
Theorem 2: Given any finite partition π: Z ! Y of the
flat output space Z of a difference flat system, the asso-
ciated transition system TF = (X, !, Y, π ° H) admits a
bisimilar quotient TF/~.
Proof: Consider the equivalence relation R that identi-
fies state pairs (x, x0) which generate identical sets of k-
length output symbol sequences y = y0 y1 . . . yk−1, and
the quotient system TF/~ induced by R. R defines a finite
partition of X (both |Y| and k are finite), and x ~ x0 ⇒
π ° H(x) = π ° H(x0) so that R respects observations.
TF ∠ TF/~ follows immediately from the definition of
quotient systems. To see that TF/~ ∠ TF, note that
flatness ensures any symbol string y = yk yk+1 . . . is
realizable by transition system TF; thus x ~ x
0 at time
t implies that x and x0 can transition to equivalent
states at time t + 1. Therefore, from Definition 2.5,
TF and TF/~ are bisimilar.
Remark 3.1: Efficient algorithms exist for checking if
a given system is difference flat, so Theorem 2 provides
a practically implementable means of identifying
discrete-time continuous state systems which admit fi-
nite bisimulation [4].
Remark 3.2: The flat output trajectory completely
defines the evolution of a difference flat system. As a
consequence, because any finite partition of flat output
space induces a finite bisimilar quotient for the flat sys-
tem, this partition can be refined to yield any desired
level of detail in the abstraction.
An analogous result holds for differentially flat HDS
continuous systems. Our development of this result
requires the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.1: A control system is differentially flat iff it
is dynamic feedback linearizable.
Proof: The proof is given in [14].
Lemma 3.2: Control system Σ admits a finite bisimu-
lation iff any representation of Σ obtained through co-
ordinate transformation and/or invertible feedback also
admits a finite bisimulation.
Proof: The proof is given in [12].
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for constructing finite bisimulations for differentially flat
systems: 1.) transform the flat system into a linear con-
trol system via feedback linearization, 2.) compute a fi-
nite bisimulation for the linear system, and 3.) map the
bisimilar model back to the original system representa-
tion. As a result, we focus on building finite bisimula-
tions for linear control systems.
In particular, the control system of interest is one “chain”





Concentrating on this system entails no loss of general-
ity, as any controllable linear system can be modeled as
a collection of these single chain systems, one for each
input, and the decoupled nature of the chains ensures
we can abstract each one independently and then
“patch” the abstractions together to obtain an abstrac-
tion for the full system.
Consider the following partition of the (assumed
bounded) state space X  ℜn of ΣBNF:
Definition 3.3: Partition πE is the map πE: X ! Y that
partitions X into subsets yis = {x2X | x12[iE, (i + 1)E),
sign(x2) = s1, . . ., sign(xn) = sn-1}, where i is an integer
and s is an (n−1)-vector of “signs” specifying a particular
orthant of X.
Note that πE partitions X into “slices” orthogonal to the
x1-axis.
We are now in a position to state
Theorem 3: The transition system TBNF = (X, !, Y, πE)
associated with system ΣBNF and partition πE admits a
finite bisimilar quotient TBNF/~ = (Y, !~, Y, id).
Proof: TBNF/~ is finite because |Y| is finite. Assume !~
is constructed so that πE(x) !~ πE(x0) , x ! x0, with the
latter specified as in Definition 3.1. Then all the conditions
of Definition 2.6 are satisfied, and from Proposition 2.2 we
need only show πE(x)!~ πE(x0) ⇒ 8x00~x ∃x000~x0 such that
x00 ! x000. This amounts to demonstrating that if x can be
driven through face F of slice πE(x) then any x
00 in that slice
can be driven through F as well, which can be shown by
checking this property for the system x1
(n) = u on each
orthant of X (see e.g., [13] for a proof that system x1
(n) = u
possesses this property).
Remark 3.3: The result given in Theorem 3 is most
useful in situations where the control input u can be
chosen large relative to the system “drift”. Abstraction
methods for applications in which control authority is
limited are given in [4].
Next we turn to the task of computing finite bisimula-
tions for HDS. We focus on constructing bisimulations for
HDS continuous systems, as HDS discrete systems alreadypossess finite state representations, and in particular on
abstracting differentially flat continuous systems; the deriv-
ation of algorithms for difference flat continuous systems is
analogous but simpler and is therefore omitted (see [4]).
Consider, without loss of generality (see Lemma 3.1),
the problem of computing a finite state abstraction for
continuous-time linear control system Σlc: dx/dt = Ax + Bu
(where A,B are matrices). The transition system associated
with Σlc is Tlc = (X, !lc, Y, h), with h: X ! Y any finite,
hypercubic partition of X and!lc specified as in Definition
3.1. The finite state abstraction of interest is quotient sys-
tem Tlc/~ = (Y,!lc~, Y, id). Observe that in order to obtain
Tlc/~ it is only necessary to determine the set of admissible
transition relations!lc~.
As most applications of interest involve large-scale sys-
tems, it is desirable to develop efficient algorithms for
computing !lc~. We now introduce such a procedure.
The algorithm decides whether a transition y !lc~ y0 be-
tween two adjacent cells of the lattice y, y0 is allowed, and
is repeated for all candidate transitions of interest. We
begin by summarizing a simple algorithm, based on com-
putational linear system results given in [15], for deciding
whether y !lc~ y0 is admissible. Let k be the number of
the coordinate axis orthogonal to the common face be-
tween y and y0, V be the set of vertices shared by y and y0,
and ak
T represent row k of A. Define Πk(w) to be the pro-
jection of vector w onto axis k, and suppose y < y0. Then y
!lc~ y0 iff Πk(Avi + Bu) > 0 for some vi 2V and u2U. An
algorithm which “operationalizes” this observation is
Algorithm 3.1:
If y < y0:
 If any element of row k of B is nonzero, y !lc~ y0 is
true. STOP.
 Repeat until y !lc~ y0 is determined to be true or all
vertices have been checked: Select a vertex vi 2 V.
 Compute the inner product p = akT vi.
 If p > 0 then y !lc~ y0 is true. STOP.
 If y !lc~ y0 has not been found to be true it is false.
If y > y0: Algorithm is the same except that the compari-
son p > 0 is replaced by p < 0.
A difficulty with Algorithm 3.1 is that the number of
vertices shared by two adjacent cells is 2n−1, so that check-
ing them becomes unmanageable even for moderately-
sized systems. Interestingly, the algorithm can be modified
so that feasibility of a transition can be tested by consider-
ing only a single well-chosen vertex, independent of the
size of the model. The new algorithm is therefore ex-
tremely efficient and can be applied to very large systems.
Let v0 be the lowest vertex (in a component-wise sense)
Figure 2 One-line diagram for the 20-bus EP grid model used
in the vulnerability assessment case study.
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+ (ak
−) be the sum of positive
(negative) elements of row k of A, excluding the diagonal.
We can now state
Algorithm 3.2 [4,16]:
If y < y0:
 If any element of row k of B is nonzero, y !lc~ y0 is
true. STOP.
 Compute the inner product p = akT v0.
 If p + ak+ > 0 then y !lc~ y0 is true. STOP.
 Otherwise y !lc~ y0 is false.
If y > y0: Algorithm is the same except that the compari-
son p + ak
+ > 0 is replaced by p + ak
− < 0.
A Matlab program which implements Algorithm 3.2 is
presented in [4]. This program has been applied to systems
with n = 10 000 state variables using desktop computers.
Additionally, standard timing studies reveal that the com-
putational cost of Algorithm 3.2 scales quadratically in the
system state space dimension n (while Algorithm 3.1 scale
exponentially in n), providing further support for the argu-
ment that this approach to abstraction can be applied to
problems of real-world scale and complexity.
Vulnerability analysis
This section considers the vulnerability assessment prob-
lem: given a complex network and a class of failures of
interest, does there exist an attack which causes the sys-
tem to experience such failure? Other important vulner-
ability analysis tasks, including vulnerability exploitation
and mitigation, are investigated in [4]. The proposed ap-
proach to vulnerability assessment leverages the finite
state abstraction results derived in the preceding section.
The basic idea is straightforward: given an HDS model
for a network of interest and a class of failures of con-
cern: 1.) construct a finite bisimulation for the HDS net-
work model, 2.) conduct the vulnerability analysis on the
system abstraction, and 3.) map the analysis results back
to the original system model.
Observe that the proposed approach possesses desir-
able characteristics. For instance, the analytic process is
scalable, because both the abstraction methodology [4]
and the tools available for detecting vulnerabilities in fi-
nite state systems [e.g., 8] are scalable. Additionally, the
analysis is rigorous. Because HDS vulnerabilities are ex-
pressible as LTL formulas, and bisimulation preserves
LTL, the original complex network and its abstraction
have identical vulnerabilities. Formal analysis tools such
as model checking [8] can be structured to identify all
vulnerabilities of the finite state abstraction, and bisimi-
larity then implies that the approach is guaranteed to
find all vulnerabilities of the original network as well.
We now quantify the proposed approach to vulnerabil-
ity assessment. It is supposed that the complex networkof interest can be modeled as an HDS, ΣHDS, and that
the network’s desired or “normal” behavior can be char-
acterized with an LTL formula φ; generalizing the situ-
ation to a set of LTL formulas {φi} is straightforward.
Consider the following
Definition 4.1: Given an HDS ΣHDS and an LTL en-
coding φ of the desired network behavior, the vulnerabil-
ity assessment problem involves determining whether
ΣHDS can be made to violate φ.
The proposed vulnerability assessment method
employs bounded model checking (BMC), a powerful
technique for deciding whether a given finite state tran-
sition system satisfies a particular LTL specification over
a finite, user-specified time horizon [8]. Briefly, BMC
checks whether a finite transition system T satisfies an
LTL specification φ on a time interval [0, k], denoted T |
= k φ, in two steps: 1.) translate T | = k φ to a propos-
ition [T, φ]k which is satisfied by, and only by, transition
system trajectories that violate φ (this is always possible),
and 2.) check if [T, φ]k is satisfiable using a modern SAT
solver [8]. Note that because modern SAT solvers are ex-
tremely powerful, this approach to model checking can
be implemented with problems of real-world scale.
We are now in a position to state our vulnerability as-
sessment algorithm. Let THDS denote the transition sys-
tem associated with ΣHDS, and consider the vulnerability
assessment problem given in Definition 4.1. We have
Algorithm 4.1: Vulnerability assessment
1. Construct a finite bisimilar abstraction T for THDS
using the results of Section 3.
2. Check satisfiability of [T, φ]k using BMC: if [T, φ]k is not satisfiable then T is not vulnerable
and thus ΣHDS is not vulnerable (on time horizon k);
 if [T, φ]k is satisfiable then T, and therefore ΣHDS,
is vulnerable, and the SAT solver “witness” is an
exploitation of the vulnerability.
Figure 3 Sample simulation results for 20-bus EP grid model. Plot at the top is from the model validation study and shows the evolution of
voltages at all 20 buses; these voltage time series are in good agreement with those observed in the corresponding cascading voltage collapse
for the actual grid. Plot at bottom depicts voltage timec series which result from applying the vulnerability exploitation procedure designed using
the proposed finite state abstraction methodology.
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vulnerability assessment we apply the analytic method to
an important complex network: an electric power (EP)
grid. EP grids are naturally represented as HDS, with the
continuous system modeling the generator and load dy-
namics as well as power flow constraints and the
discrete system capturing protection logic switching and




qþ ¼ h q; k; vð Þ;
dx=dt ¼ fq x; y; uð Þ;
0 ¼ gq x; yð Þ;
k ¼ p x; yð Þ;
where q and x are the discrete and continuous system
states, v and u denote exogenous inputs, y is the vector
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gous to those introduced in Definition 2.1.
The continuous system portion of grid model ΣEP is feed-
back linearizable [17], which implies the continuous system
is differentially flat and consequently that ΣEP admits a fi-
nite abstraction. Additionally, it can be shown that grid vul-
nerabilities are expressible as LTL formulas composed of
atomic propositions which depend only on q and k [18].
Thus Algorithm 4.1 is directly applicable to power grids.
We now summarize the results of a vulnerability assess-
ment for the 20bus grid shown in Figure 2. This grid pro-
vides a simple but useful representation of a real, national-
scale EP system for which (proprietary) data are available
to us [4]. The grid can be modeled as an HDS ΣEP of the
form given in Definition 4.2. The report [4] gives a Matlab
encoding of the specific HDS model used in this study.
Because the model ΣEP corresponds to a real-world grid,
the behaviors of the model and the actual grid can be
compared. For example, the real grid recently experienced
a large cascading voltage collapse, and data was collected
for this event. We simulated this cascading outage (see
Figure 3, top plot) and found close agreement between the
behavior of the actual grid and the model ΣEP. Observe
that this result is encouraging given the well-known diffi-
culties associated with reproducing such cascading dy-
namics with computer models (see, e.g., [17,18]).
Vulnerability assessment was performed using Algo-
rithm 4.1. It was assumed that the grid’s attacker wishes to
drive the voltage at bus 11 to unacceptably low levels, so
that the loads at this bus would not be served, and that
the attacker has only limited grid access. In particular, we
consider here a scenario in which the attacker can gain as-
sess to the generator at bus 2 via cyber means [18]. Note
that this class of vulnerabilities is interesting because the
access point – the generator at bus 2 – is geographically
remote from the target of the attack – the loads at bus 11.
The first step in the vulnerability assessment procedure
specified in Algorithm 4.1 involves constructing a finite
state bisimulation T for ΣEP; this abstraction is computed
using Algorithm 3.2. The second step in Algorithm 4.1 is
to apply BMC to T to determine if it is possible to realize
the attack objective, i.e., low voltage at bus 11, through
admissible manipulation of the generator at bus 2. We
employed NuSMV, an open source software tool for for-
mal verification of finite state systems, for this analysis
[19]. This vulnerability assessment reveals that it is pos-
sible for the attacker to realize the given objective via the
assumed grid access, and gives a finite state “trace” of one
means of exploiting the vulnerability. Using this trace, we
synthesize an exploitation attack which is directly imple-
mentable with the HDS model ΣEP. Sample simulation
results are shown in Figure 3 (bottom plot). It can be
seen from the bus voltage time series in Figure 3 that the
attacker’s goals can indeed be realized, in this case byinitiating a cascading voltage collapse which takes down
bus 11 as well as most of the rest of the grid.
Discussion
This paper presents an approach for analyzing complex
networks in which the network of interest is first
abstracted to a much simpler, but mathematically equiva-
lent, representation, the required analysis is performed
using the abstraction, and analytic conclusions are then
mapped back to the original network and interpreted there.
We identify an important class of complex networks which
admit vulnerability-preserving, finite state abstractions,
provide efficient algorithms for computing these abstrac-
tions, and offer a vulnerability analysis methodology that
combines finite state network representations with formal
analytics to enable rigorous vulnerability analysis for net-
works of real-world scale and complexity. The considerable
potential of the method is demonstrated through a case
study involving a realistic electric power grid model.
We now demonstrate that the proposed approach to
analyzing complex network dynamics can also be applied
to biological and social systems. Consider first a bio-
logical example. Many aspects of the physiology of living
organisms oscillate with a period of approximately 24
hours, corresponding to the duration of a day, and the
molecular basis for this circadian rhythm has been quan-
tified in several organisms. For instance, a useful model
for the gene regulatory network responsible for circadian







 vmP MPKmP þMP  kdMP;
dP0
dt
¼ ksPMP  V1P P0K1P þ P0 þ V2P
P1
K2P þ P1  kdP0;
dP1
dt
¼ V1P P0K1P þ P0  V2P
P1
K2P þ P1  V3P
P0
K3P þ P1
þV4P P2K4P þ P2  kdP1;
dP2
dt
¼ V3P P1K3P þ P1  V4P
P2
K4P þ P2  k3P
2
2 þ k4C
vdP P2KdP þ P2  kdP2;
dC
dt
¼ k3P22  k4C k1Cþ k2CN  kdCC;
dCN
dt
¼ k1C k2CN  kdCC;
where MP, P0, P1, P2, C, and CN are state variables cor-
responding to the concentrations of the constituents of
the circadian rhythm gene network, vsP is an exogenous
(control) input signal associated with the light–dark
cycle of the environment, and all other terms are con-
stant model parameters.
As is evident from Definition 2.7, a differentially flat
system possesses (flat) outputs, equal in number to the
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inputs to be recovered through algebraic manipulation
of these outputs and their time derivatives. In the case
of Drosophila circadian rhythm, CN is one such flat
output. To see this, note that C and its time deriva-
tives can be obtained from the sixth equation through
manipulation of CN and its derivatives. These terms, in
turn, permit P2 (and its derivatives) to be obtained
from the fifth equation, and continuing in this way up
the “chain” of equations gives all of the states and the
input vsP. Thus the system states and input can be
obtained from knowledge of CN and its derivatives,
proving that the above gene network model for Dros-
ophila circadian rhythm is differentially flat. This, in
turn, implies that the model admits a finite state bisi-
mulation (Theorem 3).
We have constructed a finite state model for Drosophila
using Algorithm 3.2, and then applied Algorithm 4.1 to this
finite state representation to identify gene network vulner-
abilities. More specifically, this methodology was employed
to identify gene network parameters whose manipulation
would quickly and efficiently reset the phase of Circadian
rhythm. The parameters nominated by this analysis are:
 mRNA transcription rate;
 mRNA degradation rate;
 protein translation rate.
It is worth noting that these Circadian phase vulnerabil-
ities are identical to the “control targets” obtained in [21]









Figure 4 Modeling social dynamics on networks with community stru
communities. The cartoon at right illustrates dynamics within a community
shows the basic HDS feedback structure, in which the HDS discrete and co
dynamics, respectively.Consider next the phenomenon of social movements,
that is, large, informal groupings of individuals and/or
organizations focused on a particular issue, for instance
of political, social, economic, or religious significance e.g.,
[22]. Given the importance of social movements and the
desire to understand their emergence and growth, numer-
ous mathematical representations have been proposed to
characterize their dynamics. For example, [23] suggests a
model in which each individual in a population of interest
can be in one of three states – member (of the move-
ment), potential member, and ex-member – and interac-
tions between individuals can lead to transitions between
these affiliation states (e.g., potential members can be per-
suaded to become members). In particular, [23] proposes
the following model for social movement dynamics:
X
sm
dP=dt ¼ λ βPMþ δ1E;
dM=dt ¼ βPM δ2ME  δ3M;
dE=dt ¼ δ2MEþ δ3M δ1E;
where P, M, and E denote the fractions of potential mem-
bers, members, and ex-members in the population, Λ can
be interpreted to be the system’s input, and β, δ1, δ2, δ3
are nonnegative constants related to the probabilities of
individuals undergoing the various state transitions. It is
worth noting that this model is shown in [23] to provide
a good description for the growth of real-world social
movements.
This model for social dynamics is differentially flat
with flat output E. To see this, observe that M and its
time derivatives can be obtained from the third equation







cture via HDS. The cartoon at top left depicts a network with three
k and between communities i and j. The schematic at bottom left
ntinuous systems model the inter-community and intra-community
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from the second equation. Finally, knowledge of P, M, E,
and their derivatives allows the input Λ to be recovered
from the first equation. Thus all of the system states as
well as the input can be obtained from knowledge of E
and its derivatives, which shows that the social movement
model is differentially flat. This, in turn, implies that
the model admits a finite state bisimilar abstraction
(see Theorem 3).
We now consider the vulnerability of social movement
dynamics. In order to make this analysis more interest-
ing, the dynamics Σsm is extended to enable modeling of
social movements propagation on networks with realistic
topologies. More specifically, it is known that real-world
social networks possess community structure, that is, the
presence of densely connected groupings of individuals
which have only relatively few links to other groups e.g.,
[22,23], and we are interested in modeling and analyzing
social movement dynamics on these networks. One way
to construct such a representation is to model move-
ment dynamics as consisting of two components: 1.)
intra-community dynamics, involving frequent interac-
tions between individuals within the same community
and the resulting gradual change in the concentrations
of movement members, and 2.) inter-community dynam-
ics, in which the movement jumps from one community
to another, for instance because a movement member
“visits” a new community.
It is natural to model these dynamics via HDS, with
the continuous system representing intra-community
dynamics via Σsm, or its finite state abstraction, the
discrete system capturing the inter-community dynam-
ics (e.g., using a simple switching rule), and the inter-
play between these dynamics being represented by the
HDS feedback structure. A detailed description of the
manner in which HDS models can be used to capture
general social dynamics on networks with realistic top-
ologies is given in [22], and the basic idea is illustrated
in Figure 4.
We have constructed a finite state model for Σsm using
Algorithm 3.2, and then connected these intra-
community dynamics models together to represent the
complete intra- and inter-community dynamics. We ap-
plied Algorithm 4.1 to this finite state representation to
identify social movement vulnerabilities. More specifically,
this methodology was employed to identify the character-
istics of social movement dynamics which are most im-
portant for movement success. This analysis indicates
that a key indicator of the ultimate success of a social
movement is significant early dispersion of a movement
across network communities; interestingly, this measure
should be more predictive than the early volume of
movement activity (which is a standard metric for pre-
dictive analysis of social dynamics).Competing interests
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